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I. Introduction 
In January of 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered 
his annual State of the Union Address during one of his famous 
Fireside Chats from the White House.1 In the face of the horrors of 
                                                                                                     
 * Candidate for Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee School of Law, 2018; 
Bachelor of Arts, cum laude, Political Science and Religious Studies, Gettysburg 
College, 2013.  
 1. See 1944 State of the Union Address: FDR’s Second Bill of 
262 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 261 (2017) 
World War II, with its crimes against humanity and egregious loss 
of life from battle and other means,2 Roosevelt stressed the 
importance of inalienable rights, entrenched in the American 
Constitution and found deep within the consciousness of American 
citizens.3 In the speech, Roosevelt stressed the importance of a 
greater, more American “standard of living . . . higher than ever 
before known.”4 This State of the Union Address became better 
known as the “Second” or “Economic Bill of Rights.”5 Roosevelt 
called for “new goals of human happiness and well-being” 
explaining: 
As our nation has grown in size and stature . . . . We have 
come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual 
freedom cannot exist without economic security and 
independence . . . . We have accepted, so to speak, a 
second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security 
and prosperity can be established for all—regardless of 
station, race or creed. The right to a useful and 
                                                                                                     
Rights or Economic Bill of Rights Speech, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT PRESIDENTIAL 
LIBR. & MUSEUM, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/stateoftheunion. 
html (last visited Dec. 1, 2017) (“On January 11, 1944, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt delivered his annual State of the Union Address to the Nation as a 
Fireside Chat from the White House.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 2. See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Message to 
Congress, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 11, 1944), http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16518 (“This Nation in the past two years has become an active 
partner in the world’s greatest war against human slavery. We have joined with 
like-minded people in order to defend ourselves in a world that has been gravely 
threatened by gangster rule.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 3. See id. (“But I do not think that any of us Americans can be content with 
mere survival. Sacrifices that we and our allies are making impose upon us all a 
sacred obligation to see to it that out of this war we and our children will gain 
something better than mere survival.”). 
 4. See id. (discussing the importance of human rights, including those of 
the economic variety: “We cannot be content, no matter how high the general 
standard of living may be, if some fraction of our people —whether it be one-third 
or one-fifth or one-tenth- is ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill housed, and insecure”). 
 5. See John Nichols, Seventy Years on, Let us Renew FDR’s Struggle for an 
Economic Bill of Rights, NATION (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/ 
article/seventy-years-let-us-renew-fdrs-struggle-economic-bill-rights/ (explaining 
the significance of the New Deal to “challenge economic royalists on behalf of the 
great mass of Americans, and to establish that wider freedom” and expressing 
concern that this goal has not yet been achieved) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or 
mines of the Nation; The right to earn enough to provide 
adequate food and clothing and recreation; . . . . The right 
of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an 
atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and 
domination by monopolies at home or abroad; . . . . The 
right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to 
achieve and enjoy good health; The right to adequate 
protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, 
accident, and employment.6  
Decades after this State of the Union and the death of Roosevelt, 
American institutions continue to experiment with how best to 
implement these “new goals of human happiness and well-being.”7 
Modern economic regulation has had a profound effect on 
Constitutional democracy, federalism and individual rights, 
transformed during the “rights revolution” of the 1960s and 
1970s.8 The rights revolution includes the creation of a set of 
fundamental legal rights afforded to all Americans, not explicitly 
mentioned in the framing of the American Constitution, but 
guaranteed through recognition of a variety of basic human 
rights.9 These rights included “rights to clean air and water; safe 
consumer products and workplaces; a social safety net including 
adequate food, medical care and shelter; and freedom from public 
and private discrimination on the basis of race, sex disability, and 
age.”10 This revolution is suggested to have been “presaged” by 
Roosevelt’s call for this Second Bill of Rights, culminating in 
                                                                                                     
 6. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, supra note 2. 
 7. Id.; see also Nichols, supra note 5 (describing Roosevelt’s legacy and his 
opinion that these goals have yet to be realized in the modern world). 
 8. See CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 1 (1990) (“Modern regulation has profoundly affected 
constitutional democracy, by renovating the original commitments to checks and 
balances, federalism, and individual rights. The nature and scope of this 
transformation, which culminated in the rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, 
have not generally been appreciated.”). 
 9. See id. at 1–10 (introducing the “rights revolution” as the promotion of 
rights unknown to the founding generation, including a healthful environment, 
safe products, and freedom from discrimination). 
 10.  See id. at v (listing the catalogue of legal rights established by the 
President and Congress that, while deviating from the original text of the 
Constitution, nonetheless have been protected by regulation and statute). 
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passage of an abundance of statutory rights in the 1960s and 
1970s.11 
Roosevelt concluded in his 1944 State of the Union with a call 
for Congress to “explore the means for implementing this economic 
bill of rights—for it is definitely the responsibility of the Congress 
to do so.”12 Notably, no Congress expressly adopted these rights, 
but a wide array of federal programs and statues have drastically 
altered the structure of the American political system and achieved 
important successes in the Nation’s framework.13 Scholars have 
noted that in certain aspects, this “rights revolution” has failed to 
serve the public interest, responding instead to powerful and self-
interested private groups.14 This rights revolution has failed in the 
face of imperfect economic rights and oppressive occupational 
regimes.15 
The Alternatives to Licensing that Lower Obstacles to Work 
Act (ALLOW Act)16 presents a potential solution and a response to 
Roosevelt’s seventy-two-year-old call to Congress to promote 
economic liberty. Occupational licensing is exclusively a state and 
local function, and has not yet been considered at the federal level 
until this juncture in United States’ policy.17 The ALLOW Act aims 
                                                                                                     
 11. See id. (explaining the renaissance of the “rights revolution,” its 
outcomes, and the progress that has yet to be achieved). 
 12. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, supra note 2. 
 13. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 18–21 (discussing New Deal 
Constitutionalism and the beginning of regulatory practices that originated 
during this period). 
 14. See id. at v (articulating the shortcomings of regulatory programs and 
explaining pitfalls that jeopardize important values, produce inefficiencies, 
uphold the power of self-interested private organizations and potential 
“nullification” of beneficial programs by the marketplace). 
 15. See Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, Can Labor Regulation Hinder 
Economic Performance? Evidence from India, 119 Q.J. ECON. 91, 93 (2004) 
(asserting that countries with higher regulation of occupational entry perform 
worst in “an array” of economic indicators, including social, political, and 
economic). 
 16. See Alternatives to Licensing that Lower Obstacles to Work Act of 2016, 
S. 3158, 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter ALLOW Act] (reducing the 
anticompetitive impact of licensing requirements by making targeted changes to 
licensure policies). 
 17. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ISSUES IN PRICE MAINTENANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 33 (1975) 
[hereinafter NAAG] (outlining the occupational licensing framework, or lack 
thereof, in the federal government). 
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to create federal licensure policy, restrict the power of licensing 
regimes implemented at the state level and through the blessing 
of state government, relieve the burden of taxing requirements 
throughout the states and eliminate exclusionary practices of 
various state licensing boards.18 
The ALLOW Act, if passed, has the potential to relieve 
occupational licensing burdens for military families and residents 
in affected industries in the District of Columbia.19 By 
harmonizing occupational entry requirements through 
endorsement of licensing and public certifications issued in any 
state, the act would promote more opportunities for military 
families, disproportionately affected by state licensing laws.20 The 
Act aims to serve as a model for occupational licensing reforms in 
the states by making the District of Columbia its example. It is 
focused on promoting less restrictive requirements and more 
legislative oversight of licensing boards, many of which have 
become corrupt and unduly restrictive of entry.21 Accordingly, this 
Note discusses the Constitutionality of the ALLOW Act and argues 
it is Constitutionally defendable, applicable, and necessary to 
adjust the framework of occupational licensing regimes in the 
United States, when analyzed on the Commerce Clause, Army 
                                                                                                     
 18. See Press Release, Office of Congressman Mark Meadows, Rep. Meadows 
Introduces ALLOW Act (Nov. 15, 2016), https://meadows.house.gov/media-
center/press-releases/rep-meadows-introduces-the-allow-act [hereinafter 
Meadows Press Release] (explaining the desired outcome of implementing the 
ALLOW Act) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); see also BENJAMIN SHIMBERG, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A PUBLIC 
PERSPECTIVE 8 (1982) (describing previous Congressional attempts to eliminate 
occupational licensing regimes with exclusionary practices that impact job 
opportunities of individuals seeking professional licensing). 
 19. See generally ALLOW Act, supra note 16 (discussing the possible impact 
the ALLOW Act can have on occupational licensing burdens). 
 20. See ALLOW Act Summary, MIKE LEE U.S. SEN. UTAH, 
https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/alternatives-to-licensing-that-lower-
obstacles-to-wrok-allow-act (last visited Dec. 1, 2017) [hereinafter ALLOW Act 
Summary] (describing the desired outcome of the senate bill as reducing “the 
anticompetitive impact of unjustifiable licensing requirements by making 
targeted changes to licensure policies”) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see generally ALLOW Act, supra note 16 
(same).  
 21. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (explaining the benefits of the 
ALLOW Act for military families, individuals in the District of Columbia, and 
those on Federal lands). 
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Clause, Supremacy Clause, and the Federal Enclave Clause. This 
Note also suggests that the ALLOW Act should, go further to 
protect the ability of rightfully qualified citizens to work in their 
trained occupations across the United States. 
This Note explores the remedies provided by the ALLOW Act 
to curtail restrictive occupational licensing methods that 
negatively impact low to moderate income families as well as 
military families and personnel. Section II will define occupational 
licensing, explore the origins and criticisms of the regulatory 
practice, summarize the effects and benefits, and finally will 
outline the practical failures of occupational licensing in modern 
America. Section III outlines the ALLOW Act, its targeted 
beneficiaries, and the remedies the Act proposes. Section IV will 
review the constitutionality of the Act as it stands today. Section 
V analyzes the limits of any possible expansions of the Act, 
considering the constitutional limitations under the Tenth 
Amendment. Finally, section VI concludes this examination with a 
call to Congress pass the ALLOW Act to protect the professional 
freedom of thousands of American citizens. 
II. Occupational Regulation: Classification, History, Benefits, and 
Repercussions 
Many professionals are licensed by the state, and while some 
of the professions that require state licenses include professions 
that one would assume, e.g., doctors, lawyers, architects, and 
nurses, and licensing administrations typically cover many more 
professions.22 Additional professions include a wide variety and 
                                                                                                     
 22. See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should 
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1103 
(2014) (“Where licensing was once reserved for lawyers, doctors, and other 
“learned professionals,” now floral designers, fortune tellers, and taxidermists are 
among the jobs that , at least in some states, require licensing.”); see also MORRIS 
M. KLEINER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
POLICIES 21 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ 
THP_KleinerDiscPaper_final.pdf [hereinafter HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER] 
(“[S]ome occupations would benefit from lesser forms of regulation, such as 
certification or registration, or even no regulation. For example, services provided 
by [some professions] may not pose sufficient risk to health and safety to warrant 
the full regulation or right to practice of licensure.”) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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extensive list of specialties including, but not limited to: 
cosmetologists, polygraph examiners, florists, casket makers, 
auctioneers, interior designers, real estate appraisers, social 
workers, cemetery operators, fortune tellers, dental hygienist, 
mussel dealers, maple dealers, photographers, reptile catchers, 
and cat groomers.23 The list is extensive and, at times, seemingly 
arbitrary and absurd.24 This extensive list of licensed professions 
varies between the states, as do the requirements to obtain a 
license.25 While regulatory measures do serve an important 
purpose in ensuring quality services, more often than not, these 
practices place “burdens on workers, employers, and 
consumers . . . [that] too often are inconsistent, inefficient, and 
arbitrary.”26 
                                                                                                     
 23. See Edlin & Rebecca Haw, supra note 22, at 1096 (“[N]early a third of 
American workers need a state license to perform their job legally, and the trend 
toward licensing is continuing.”); see also Paul J. Larkin, Public Choice Theory 
and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 210 (2016) (listing 
several professions licensed in the states); see also Alexandra Klein, Note, The 
Freedom to Pursue a Common Calling, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 416 (2015) 
(naming a number of licensed professions and noting the absurdity of a number 
of the professions that require a license to work); see also DICK M. CARPENTER ET 
AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM 
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 8 (2012), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/licenseto 
work1.pdf (classifying the requirements for 102 licensed occupations across the 
United States) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 24. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 219 (“Some of the occupations found on that 
list are odd, to say the least. Are the health, welfare, and safety of the community 
really put at risk if society allows unlicensed florists, interior designers, and frog 
famers to ply their trades?”); see also Klein, supra note 23, at 415 (“The list of 
occupations subject to licensing can be quite absurd . . . .”); see also HAMILTON 
DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 5 (explaining that occupations in some states 
require licensing, while in other states, mere certification or registration is 
required). 
 25. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 220 (discussing inconsistencies between the 
states on licensing requirements generally, exemplified by the barber example, a 
profession licensed by forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, each state 
requiring a series of unique tests and certification hours); see also Edlin & Haw, 
supra note 22, at 1095–97 (providing the example of cosmetologists, a profession 
that requires, in some states, more certification hours than Emergency Medical 
Technicians). 
 26. See THE WHITE HOUSE, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 7 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ 
docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf [hereinafter WH FRAMEWORK] 
(explaining the inconsistencies between the states on state licensed professions) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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A. What is Occupational Licensing? 
Occupational regulation, including occupational licensing, 
gained popularity during the twentieth century.27 Licensing 
requirements have become one of the “fastest growing labor 
market institutions in the United States since World War II.”28 
Occupational regulation protects both consumers and 
professionals, ensuring that services are provided only by qualified 
personnel.29 These regulations take three basic forms: registration, 
certification, and licensing.30 Registration, the least restrictive 
form of regulation,31 generally requires individuals interested in 
pursuing certain employment to pay a fee or post a bond and file 
their name, address, and qualification with the government to 
ensure that practitioners can be reached in the event of a 
complaint.32 Registration does not deny the right to practice to any 
                                                                                                     
 27. See CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 1, 2–3 (1990), https://www.ftc.gov/system 
/files/documents/reports/costs-benefits-occupational-regulation/cox_foster_-_ 
occupational_licensing.pdf (examining a brief history of occupational regulation 
in the United States and the historical relevance of occupational licensing’s 
relevance throughout the nation’s history) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also SHIMBERG, supra note 18, at 5 
(discussing the history of occupational regulation); see also NAAG, supra note 17, 
at 33 (“[Occupational licensing] has gained increasingly widespread acceptance 
in the United States during the last century and especially in the last fifty years. 
A review of the state codes for 1968–69 found almost 2,800 statutory provisions 
requirement occupational licensing, with hundreds of occupations requiring a 
license.”). 
 28. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22 (describing the historical 
context in which occupational licensing gained increased relevance in the United 
States). 
 29. See Rafael Gomez et al., Do Immigrants Gain or Lose by Occupational 
Licensing?, 41 CAN. PUB. POL’Y S80, S81 (2015) (articulating the rationale for 
occupational regulation, the various forms of occupational regulation, and the role 
of the government to regulate the trade). 
 30. See Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of 
Occupational Licensing, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 676, 676 (2010) (“Occupational 
regulation in the USA generally takes three forms.”). 
 31. See id. (explaining the process of obtaining registration with the 
regulating body that oversees the profession).  
 32. See WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 7 n.6 (defining the two “other less 
restrictive forms of occupational regulation . . .” registration and certification); see 
also Larkin, supra note 23, at 210 (outlining the three basic forms of occupational 
regulation and the regulatory bodies policing threshold requirements). 
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registered person as long as they pay required fees.33 Certification 
is “an intermediate form of regulation”34 or “right-to-title” 
regulating professions that allow almost any individual with 
varied levels of experience to perform the duties of the profession.35 
To prove an attained level of skill and knowledge required for 
certification, applicants must complete a certifying examination, 
administered by a state government agency or a private certifying 
body, proving an achieved level of skill and knowledge for 
certification.36 Finally, the most restrictive form of occupational 
regulation is licensure, often referred to as the “right to practice.”37 
As compared to registration and certification, licensure appears 
frivolously complicated and expansive.38 
Occupational licensing is the “process where entry into an 
occupation requires the permission of the government”39 and “by 
which governments establish qualifications required to practice 
[the] trade or profession.”40 The Council of State Governments 
define licensure as: 
                                                                                                     
 33. See NAAG, supra note 17, at 33 (noting the registration fee requirement). 
 34. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 210 (“Certification . . . permits anyone to 
practice in a particular field, but the government or a private association 
identifies an applicant’s educational or skill level, typically based on an 
examination, and issues a certificate to that effect.”). 
 35. See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 30, at 677 (discussing the process of 
obtaining a certification, comparing the practice to the other forms of occupational 
licensure); see also WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 7 n.6 (defining certification, 
or “right-to-title” regulation, describing that any person who passes an 
examination is eligible to receive certification); see generally id. at 209 (describing 
the three forms of occupational regulation). 
 36. See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 30, at 677 (explaining the certification 
process and the administrative bodies that assign certificates for participation); 
see also NAAG, supra note 17 (“[C]ertification is not however, a prerequisite to 
practice of the occupation. Some authorities content that certification or 
registration are appropriate alternatives to licensing for many occupations.”). 
 37. See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 30, at 677 (describing the 
formulations of occupational regulation and their functions). 
 38. See id. (comparing licensure to registration and certification, and noting 
that more than 800 occupation require a license in at least one state). 
 39. See Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 
191 (2000) (analyzing studies and criticism of occupational regulation in 
America). 
 40. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 5 (providing evidence 
of the effects of occupational licensing on a variety of factors, including wages and 
professional entry). 
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[T]he granting by some competent authority of a right or 
permission to carry on a business or do an act which 
otherwise would be illegal. The essential elements of 
licensing involve the stipulation of circumstances under 
which permission to perform an otherwise prohibited 
activity may be granted—largely a legislative function; 
and the actual granting of the permission in specific 
cases—generally an administrative responsibility.41 
Due to the explosion of the service sector, an industry widely 
covered by state licensing, the number of jobs requiring 
occupational licenses in the United States has rapidly increased, 
and the trend towards more licensing continues to grow.42 
According to a White House report released in 2015, more than a 
third of jobs in the United State require some form of state 
licensing, with the majority of these licenses administered by the 
states themselves.43 
                                                                                                     
 41. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
LEGISLATION IN THE STATES 5 (1952); see also PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE 
STATES 134 (2004) (quoting the Council of State Government’s definition of 
occupational licensing, and providing additional definitional context); see also 
NAAG, supra note 17 (explaining the difference between occupational licensing 
and other forms of state regulation of occupations).  
 42. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1093, 1095–96 (discussing one of the 
reasons why the occupational licensing has increased so drastically since the 
1950s); see also Marlene A. Lee & Mark Mather, U.S. Labor Trends, POPULATION 
BULL. 3, 7 (June 2008), http://www.prb.org/pdf08/63.2uslabor.pdf (describing 
trends in occupations since the 1950s, including a decrease in manufacturing 
professions and an increase in service-related professions) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Larkin, supra 
note 23, at 209 (“What you might not expect to hear is that lines of work requiring 
an occupational license are among the fastest growing types of employment in the 
United States.”); see also HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22 
(“Occupational Licensing has been one of the fastest growing labor market 
institutions in the United States since World War II.”); see also Kleiner & 
Krueger, supra note 30, at 676 (“One of the fastest growing, yet least understood, 
institutions in the U.S. labor market is occupational licensing. The movement to 
a service-oriented economy from manufacturing, where unions and contracts were 
prominent, created a demand for a ‘web of rules’ of the workplace that licensing 
may have provided.”) 
 43. See WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 3 (“More than one-quarter of U.S. 
workers now require a license to do their jobs, with most of these workers licensed 
by the States. The share of workers licensed at the State level has risen five-
fold.”).  
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Further, since 1950, state-administered licenses have 
increased five-fold.44 Notwithstanding the number of jobs that 
require occupational licenses and the historical prevalence of 
occupational licensing practices, “the study of occupational 
licensing has gone into partial eclipse.”45 Despite the relative lack 
of research conducted in this arena, the effects of the regulatory 
practice are relevant and pertinent policy issues.46 
An extremely rigorous form of occupational regulation, 
licensure requires the state to grant permission to an individual to 
enter a field of employment.47 This is often referred to as the “right 
to practice.”48 The majority of these occupations is regulated by 
licensing boards on the state level and composed of “active 
professionals, political appointees . . . and members of the public 
appointed by an executive official.”49 These boards, created by the 
state legislature, define the qualifications necessary to receive 
practice certifications within the occupation in question.50 
State legislatures typically grant professions the right to 
essentially self-regulate.51 This led to a self-regulated industry 
                                                                                                     
 44. See id. (describing the rate at which the number of state administered 
occupational licenses grew over the past sixty years). 
 45. See Kleiner, supra note 39, at 190 (noting the relatively sparse research 
conducted on current occupational licensing practices despite its prevalence in the 
United States). 
 46. See TESKE, supra note 41, at 134 (“Occupational regulation covers [a 
significant] percent of the American work force, so how states regulate, and the 
effects of such regulation are important policy issues.”). 
 47. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 211 (explaining the extent of the licensing 
process, requiring a different procedure at the federal, state, and local levels with 
different processes). 
 48. See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 30, at 676 (“One of the fastest-growing 
yet least understood institutions in the US labour [sic.] market is occupational 
licensing.”). 
 49. See Klein, supra note 23, at 416 (describing the process by which 
licensing boards are created and the “hands-off” attitude assumed by the 
appointing legislative bodies); see also Kleiner, supra note 39, at 191 (articulating 
the compilation of boards licensing boards). 
 50. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 213 (“States have developed a common 
licensing apparatus. Ordinarily, legislatures create licensing boards, and 
governors frequently appoint members to those boards from within the profession 
itself.”); see also NAAG, supra note 17 (discussing the legislatures role in 
authorization of occupational licensing regimes); see generally S. DAVID YOUNG, 
THE RULE OF EXPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA 9–14 (1987) 
(discussing occupational licensing in America). 
 51. See TESKE, supra note 41, at 135 (describing the traditional role of 
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with very limited, or completely restricted, roles for bureaucratic 
commissions and agencies to oversee any function of the 
professional licensing arena.52 The boards that do require 
government appointments typically receive selection guidance 
from the professional board itself.53 Despite the domination of 
these boards by active members of their respective industries, 
professional boards are sanctioned by the state and are considered 
a part of the state’s infrastructure.54 Self-regulated boards have 
been questioned by a variety of economists, raising concern that 
these boards are inefficient and engage in corrupt practices.55 
To obtain licensure in one of these professions, these state 
institutions typically require significant training hours, 
qualification exams, and fees.56 Most common requirements 
include formal education in the targeted profession, prior 
experience in the form of internships or apprenticeships, 
                                                                                                     
administrative agency oversight of occupational licensing groups). 
 52. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 213 (articulating the different types of 
commissions that form these administrative licensing boards); see also YOUNG, 
supra note 50, at 29 (explaining that legislatures create the licensing boards and 
the process); see also Simon Rottenberg, The Economics of Occupational 
Licensing, in ASPECTS OF LABOR ECONOMICS 3, 14 (Universities-National Bureau 
Committee for Economic Research ed., 1962) (discussing that state governors 
typically appoint the legislature but they often appoint with guidance from the 
existing board); see also Michael J. Phillips, Entry Restrictions in the Lochner 
Court, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 405, 410 (1996) (describing the hypocrisy in licensing 
board appointment systems and the process in which the system is established). 
 53. See Phillips, supra note 52, at 410 (noting that the legislature defines the 
occupational qualifications, or empowers the board to do so, requiring formal 
education, prior experience, internship, and evaluation of good character).  
 54. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1095–96 (drawing comparisons 
between the creation of licensing boards and commodities boards or product 
coalition groups and their common practices); see also MORRIS M. KLEINER, 
LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 65–96 
(2006) (discussing the power that state sanctioned boards have under the state’s 
umbrella); see also Kleiner, supra note 39, at 191 (explaining the composition of 
state licensing boards). 
 55. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1096 (“Some boards use their power 
to limit price competition or restrict the quantity of services available.”); see also 
HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 12–13 (discussing the negligible 
influence of occupational licensing on quality of service, if at all). 
 56. See Klein, supra note 23, at 416 (describing the licensing statutes and 
requirements that potentially hinder individuals pursing licensed professions); 
see also CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 8 (indicating that the licensing for 
professions typically held by low-to-moderate-income workers are typically 
unnecessary). 
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examinations, or a certification of character and fitness.57 In turn, 
the licensing boards prepare the exams, sets the pass rate, reviews 
the applicant’s qualifications, and adjudicates complaints against 
individuals within the profession.58 Variation of the licensing 
processes described operated consistently since the early 1900s.59 
As of 2017, states are responsible for regulating these 
occupations and professions without any significant or direct role 
for the federal government.60 These entities are often guarded from 
any independent review or oversight from the state, as the state 
typically allows the professional board to establish their own 
procedures.61 Theoretically, this regulatory practice serves the 
public interest by remedying “an information asymmetry market 
failure in which professionals know far more about their own 
competence than do their consumers.”62 To encourage these safety 
measures and objectives, legislatures attempted to authorize 
certain occupations to license and discipline their own 
memberships.63 In practice, occupational regulations provide entry 
restrictions for these professions, bearing some similarity to 
                                                                                                     
 57. See Phillips, supra note 52, at 410 (articulating the “phenomenon of 
occupational licensing” and the requirements involving formal schooling, 
experience, personal attributes, and residency). 
 58. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 617 (explaining the duties of the licensing 
board). 
 59. See id. (“The process has operated in a consistent manner for more than 
a century.”). 
 60. See TESKE, supra note 41, at 133 (“The states regulate occupations and 
professions with no significant, direct role for the federal government.”). 
 61. See id. at 207–08 (noting that reform groups argue for “stronger 
legislative review of regulations and improvement in the oversight and review of 
administrative decisions by independent third parties”). 
 62. See id. at 133 (describing the imbalance between consumers or 
applicants and the licensing board itself); see, e.g., Jarod M. Bona, The Antitrust 
Implications of Licensed Occupations Choosing Their Own Exclusive Jurisdiction, 
5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 28, 45 (2011) (explaining the tendency of groups 
and individual to further their own interests and the reach of their group’s 
occupation, often to the detriment of consumers, interested applicants, and other 
occupations); see also Edlin & Haw, supra note 23, at 1096 (“Licensing boards are 
largely dominated by active members of their respective industries . . . [and] use 
their power to limit price competition or restrict the quantity of services 
available.”).  
 63. See NAAG, supra note 17 (discussing the objective of licensing regimes 
and the purpose behind creating licensing associations). 
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monopoly and competition regulation practices.64 The outstanding 
question considers whether occupational regulation serves the 
interests of the public, consumers and the profession by improving 
quality; or if the practice merely limits competition, raises prices 
and furthers the interests of self-serving licensing groups.65 
Notably, both the interests of the consumer and the profession 
would be furthered if occupational regulatory practices were 
followed in perfect order and only applied to professions that posed 
true threats to health and safety.66 The concern of scholars across 
the political spectrum is that these regulatory practices have come 
to serve the profession and the licensing board rather than truly 
protecting the public’s interest or consumer demand.67 
B. Origins of Occupational Licensing 
Occupational regulation practices originate from the ancient 
Babylonian Code to medieval European guilds.68 In the United 
States, evidence of occupational licensing regulations emerged as 
early as the American colonies, subjecting bakers, ferry workers, 
leather merchants, and innkeepers to the practice.69 The creation 
and growth of “modern day professions,” such as teachers, dentists, 
and accountants, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, led to 
a rise in self-regulating occupations, establishing set standards 
                                                                                                     
 64. See id. (paralleling occupational regulation and its comparisons to 
various free market theories). 
 65. See generally CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23 (evaluating the harms 
that occupational licensing professions ultimately apply to low-to-moderate-
income professions). 
 66. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 5 (explaining the 
rationale for occupational licensing boards and that the system would be less 
complex if training requirements were related to training for improvements in 
quality rather than arbitrary attempts to increase hours and if they were reserved 
for occupations that potentially pose risks to public health or safety). 
 67. See generally Edlin & Haw, supra note 22 (comparing licensing boards to 
cartels: colluding, acting purely out of self-interest and unethically blocking 
competition within their industries). 
 68. See COX & FOSTER, supra note 27, at 2 (“Regulation of the professions can 
be traced to the Code of Hammurabi in ancient Babylon and the guilds in 
medieval Europe.”). 
 69. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 213–14 (explaining the prevalence of 
occupational licensing regimes throughout western history).  
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and guidelines of practice.70 Between 1880 and 1930, there was an 
significant increase of specialized scientific knowledge, giving rise 
to new specialized fields.71 This expansion in knowledge led to the 
ability of fewer individuals to claim to be “generalists” and instead, 
fell into the category of “specialist.”72 The increasing complexity of 
scientific knowledge created a call for more individuals to become 
specialized in certain fields, or “specialists.”73 During this time, 
universities and other institutions of higher education emerged to 
meet the demand of the consumer and of those seeking to acquire 
the skills to pursue specialized professions.74 
The emergence of specialized professionals during the 
Progressive Era, as well as integration of the national economy and 
urbanization, led to significant changes in the labor market 
seeking expert services from this new class of specifically educated 
specialists.75 Before this time, markets relied on and selected 
“expert” specialists within communities based on reputation.76 
With the rise in urbanization, local reputations were less effective, 
as services offered became more varied, common, and 
anonymous.77 Groups began to develop professional societies to 
                                                                                                     
 70. See Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise 
of Professionals and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing 3 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10467, 2004) http://www.nber.org/papers 
/w10467.pdf (noting that in 1900, only four percent of Americans were engaged in 
“learned professions,” while the number rose to twenty percent by 2000) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 71. See id. at 9 (explaining the context from which occupational licensing 
was created and noting the rapid expansion in the number of scientific periodicals 
published from the eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth). 
 72. See id. at 10 (comparing a generalist versus a specialist and discussing 
the historic relevance of the terms). 
 73. See id. (describing how it may have been possible for someone like 
Leonardo da Vinci to master several disciplines in the 1500s, but “it was clearly 
not feasible to be a master of more than one of these fields by the early 1900s”). 
 74. See id. (contextualizing the rise in educational institutions that led to 
educational requirements in occupational licensing regimes, specifically the 
longer periods of formal educational required to engage in these professions). 
 75. See id. (describing how specialized professional markets before the 
progressive era in the United States relied heavily on local generalists, chosen 
through word of mouth and reputation). 
 76. See id. at 10–11 (“This movement of the population out of the countryside 
and into increasingly dense cities was accompanied by the rise of impersonal 
exchange as the dominant form of market interaction.”).  
 77. See id. at 11 (“Specialization and the rise of impersonal exchange created 
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substitute for local reputation.78 Membership requirements in 
these societies required minimum standards, theoretically 
allowing community members to readily trust the quality of service 
members of these groups provided.79 Membership requirements 
was often very low, so it became increasingly difficult for service 
providers to establish a good reputation for the quality of their 
services.80 
Occupational licensing requirements established by state 
governments emerged in response to the specialization of 
professions and the rise of professional services.81 As early as 1870, 
states began to adopt occupational licensing laws.82 Licensing laws 
continued to grow over the next several decades, and these early 
occupational regulation regimes began to crystallize during the 
early 1900s.83 Since World War II, “occupational licensing has been 
among the fastest growing labor market institutions in the United 
                                                                                                     
problems for producers and consumers in a wide variety of markets.”).  
 78. See id. (explaining that membership in professional societies or 
organization helped to substitute for local reputation, allowing access to 
specialists in a desired field). 
 79. See id. (noting that relying on members of these societies came with a 
high level of risk, because the quality of service these individuals provided was 
quite varied). 
 80. See id. (“Membership in key professional society or associations [was] a 
partial substitute for local reputation, but in an environment where professional 
societies were proliferating in nearly every occupation, . . . the requirements for 
membership . . . were often . . . low, the signalizing value associated with 
membership in any given society . . . [was not] high.”). 
 81. See COX & FOSTER, supra note 27, at 11 (“Specialization and the rise of 
impersonal exchange in the market for professional services were accompanied 
by a sudden surge in state government occupational licensing regulation.”). 
 82. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 213 (“In the nineteenth-century America, 
states and localities licensed barbers, embalmers, horseshoers, boarding house 
operators, insurance agents, midwives, pawnbrokers, physicians, real-estate 
brokers, steamboat operators, undertakers, and veterinarians.”)  
 83. See id. (describing the increase of occupational licensing in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century and listing the variety of occupations that 
required licensing at that time); see also Law & Kim, supra note 70, at 3–6 
(outlining the history of occupational licensing and various theories that lead to 
its creation).  
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States”84 and the share of workers with state issued occupational 
license have risen “five-fold since the 1950s.”85 
C. The History of Free Market Theory and Occupational 
Licensing’s Influences 
The history of occupational regulation practices provides 
context in economic liberty ideals. Economic liberty is defined as 
the “right to pursue an honest living in a business or profession 
free from arbitrary government interference.”86 The Founding 
Fathers protected economic liberty as a natural right, considering 
the ability to conduct business and earn money among the most 
important governmental interest.87 Political theorist Adam Smith 
believed that governments should not interfere in business, 
arguing that a free market model without the burden of market 
subsidies or “favors,” would serve the best interests of the 
consumer and business.88 
                                                                                                     
 84. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 2 (explaining the 
increase in occupational licensing discoveries and their important influence on 
wage determination, benefits, and employment and prices in ways that impose 
costs on society with questionable added benefit). 
 85. See WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 7 (quantifying the increase in 
these occupations). 
 86. See CLINT BOLICK, DAVID’S HAMMER, THE CASE FOR AN ACTIVIST JUDICIARY 
98 (2007) (appealing to the reasoning of early American free-market economic 
theorists). Milton Friedman also described an “essential part of economic 
freedom” as the: 
[F]reedom to use the resources we possess in accordance with our own 
values—freedom to enter any occupation, engage in any business 
enterprise, buy from and sell to anyone else, so long as we do so on a 
strictly voluntary basis and do not resort to force in order to coerce 
others. Today you are not free to offer your services as a lawyer, a 
physician, a dentist, a plumber, a barber, a mortician, or engage in a 
host of other occupations, without first getting a permit or license from 
a government official. 
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 66 
(1979). 
 87. See Lana Harfoush, Grave Consequences for Economic Liberty: The 
Funeral Industry’s Protectionist Occupational Licensing Scheme, the Circuit Split, 
and Why It Matters, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 135, 137 (2011) (describing 
the important of economic liberty at the nation’s founding).  
 88. See id. at 137–38 (summarizing Adam Smith’s theory, promoting 
business rights without government interference). 
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Further, in Smith’s Wealth of Nations, he argued against 
regulation or restriction of a worker in any capacity, arguing that 
this regulation hinders the working man from: 
[E]mploying this strength and dexterity [of his hands] . . . 
is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a 
manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the 
workman, and of those who might be disposed to employ 
him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks 
proper, so it hinders the others from employing whom 
they think proper. To judge whether he is fit to be 
employed, may surely be trusted to the discretion of the 
employers whose interest it so much concerns. The 
affected anxiety of the law-giver lest they should employ 
an improper person, is evidently as impertinent as it is 
oppressive. The institution . . . can give no security that 
insufficient workmanship shall not be frequently be 
exposed to public sale.89 
This sentiment embodies the attitudes toward suggestions of the 
monopolization of business prior to the nation’s founding.90 In fact, 
the Founder’s mindset was riddled with “concern about the evils of 
state-granted monopolies.”91 Further, the Framers of the 
                                                                                                     
 89. See Kleiner, supra note 39, at 189 (furthering the thesis that 
apprenticeships are not a true method of quality assurance nor are they useful in 
calculating the skill or workmanship of a potential candidate for licensure 
(quoting ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS Book I, Chapter 10, Part II (2016))).  
 90. See Clark Niely, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis 
Test, 1 NYU J. L. & Liberty 897, 900 (2005) (explaining the historical lead up to 
monopolies in American since before the American Revolution). As articulated by 
Clark Niely: 
Government creation of occupational monopolies like these at the 
behest of politically powerful special interests has a long, sordid, and 
well-documented history at common law. . . . Indeed, one of the iconic 
events leading up to the American Revolution—the Boston Tea Party—
was prompted by the colonists’ frustration with (and attempts to avoid) 
the legal monopoly on the importation of tea that had been granted by 
the Crown to the East India Company. 
Id. 
 91. See id. at 900 (“Concern about the evils of state-granted monopolies was 
so prevalent at the founding that four states—Massachusetts, North Carolina, 
New Hampshire, and New York—included prohibition against monopolies in 
their proposed bill of rights when ratifying the Constitution.”); see also THE 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: PART ONE: SEPTEMBER 1787 TO FEBRUARY 1788, at 
944 (Bernard Baylin ed., 1993) (describing the conversation on economic rights in 
ratifying conventions of the U.S. Constitution). 
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause 
“intended to protect, . . . the traditional right to earn a living free 
from unreasonable interference.”92 It is argued that the clause was 
enacted in response to occupational licensing restrictions meant to 
exclude newly freed slaves from obtaining employment, earning a 
living, or owning property.93 
Regulation of entry into occupations date as far back as the 
Middle Ages, but has gained widespread acceptance in the United 
States over the last 150 years.94 Occupational licensing regimes 
dramatically increased at the turn of the twentieth century, 
correlating with the decrease in protection of economic liberties 
due to mass immigration from patterns of Irish immigrants, 
European Jews, Catholics, Asians, and African Americans.95 In 
order for businesses and workers to protect their jobs and 
livelihoods in light of the arrival and availability of new cheap 
labor, licensing laws were applied with increased vigor.96 While 
these laws were intended to protect the jobs of these classes, they 
ultimately lead to exclusionary boundaries of these immigrant and 
recently politically disenfranchised groups, restricting the access 
to these professions.97 The application of these laws, initially 
                                                                                                     
 92. See Harfoush, supra note 87, at 138 (describing the restrictive regime 
Occupational Licensing imposed on African Americans in the aftermath of the 
Civil War and the reparations intended by the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy 
this regime). 
 93. See id. (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities clause 
was ‘intended to protect, among other things, the traditional right to earn a living 
from unreasonable interference.’”). 
 94. See NAAG, supra note 17 (“The requirement that an individual be 
licensed in order to practice has been extended to an increasing number of 
professions and occupations. It has gained an increasingly widespread acceptance 
in the United States during the last century and especially in the last 50 years.”). 
 95. See id. (explaining the correlative shift in occupational licensing 
practices as related to increased immigration, Irish and other European 
immigrants, as well as the political establishment of previously disenfranchised 
groups such as African Americans, Catholics, and, in some cases, women). 
 96. See Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion a Legitimate State 
Interest? Four Recent Cases Test the Boundaries 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023, 
1028 (2005) (“The exercise of the police power is available only for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare . . . . It cannot be used to promote private gain or 
advantage  . . . . Unfortunately . . . occupational licensing is subject to rent-
seeking.”). 
 97. See id. (“Contrary to their image as devices for protecting the public, 
licensing laws frequently do nothing more that “benefit . . . the practitioners who 
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intended to promote public health and safety, became a perverted 
tool for hindering competition.98 
D. Who Feels the Effects of Occupational Licensing? 
Despite the eruption in occupational licensing laws in the last 
several decades,99 there is little scholarly attention directed to the 
phenomenon that twice as many workers are covered by licensing 
statutes than are affected by minimum wage statutes or union 
labor contracts.100 
It is undeniable that occupational licensing practices are 
growing, affecting the livelihoods of thousands of Americans, 
ranging from “dentists, doctors, lawyers, fortune tellers, and frog 
farmers [that] are now licensed occupation in either all or some 
U.S. states.”101 Occupational regulation, seemingly wholly 
disconnected from party-lines, effect a growing body of workers 
and occupations.102 With relatively little scholarship on the issue, 
the practice irrefutably affects a large number of Americans.103 
Many people, including individuals licensed in these professions, 
                                                                                                     
are in the industry at the time the restrictions are imposed.”).  
 98. See id. (“The result, as we shall see, is that licensing laws, which limit 
economic opportunity, were originally allowed insofar as they protect the public 
health and safety—but have, as economists predicted, become perverted into a 
tool for obstructing competition.”). 
 99. See Chris Burks, The Right to Work: The Rise in Occupational Licensing 
Litigation Comes to Arkansas 51-SPG ARK. L. 22, 22–23 (2016) (discussing the 
growth of occupational licensing in economic theory). 
 100. See id. (describing the findings of various institutions finding the 
prevalence of the practice despite lack of understanding toward the subject). 
 101. See id. at 23 (“We can now say with certainty that occupational licensing 
is growing.”); see also Larkin, supra note 23, at 218–19 (explaining the expansive 
nature of occupational licensing regimes). 
 102. See Burks, supra note 99, at 23 (discussing that more than a quarter of 
U.S. workers now require a license to do their jobs, the phenomena stemming 
from the increase in the number of professions requiring a license and due to the 
changing composition of the workforce); see also WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, 
at 19–23 (describing the uptick and occupational licenses since World War II and 
the reasons for the phenomena). 
 103. See Burks, supra note 99, at 23 (“Occupational regulation seems wholly 
disconnected from party-specific ideology.”). 
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do not understand the way the system works and how it affects 
consumers.104 
Occupational licensing, and regulation generally, is justified 
by the Public Interest or Market Failure Theory.105 Developed in 
the 1930s, “welfare economic theory”106 or the Market Failure 
Theory, suggests that government should regulate areas that the 
market cannot adequately perform due to structural flaws such as 
externalities, transaction costs, natural monopolies, and other 
various collection action problems.107 
Public Interest Theory introduces several concerns.108 Firs, 
unwarranted or mistaken government intervention in market 
issues are difficult to remedy, as the passage of legislation through 
Congress is a lengthy process and laws remain in effect absent a 
repeal or sunset deadline.109 While the issues calling for the 
regulation “may be transient . . . the statues passed to remedy 
                                                                                                     
 104. See SHIMBERG, supra note 18, at 11 (“Although there has been a marked 
increase in public discussion about occupational licensing, many people, including 
active professionals, do not fully understand how the system works, how it affects 
consumers, what critics and defenders are saying, and what remedies are being 
proposed to deal with alleged shortcomings.”). 
 105. Larkin, supra note 23, at 224 (describing the Market Failure Theory and 
how it inspires regulation); see, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition 
Among Pressure Groups for Political influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371, 383 (1983) 
(“This analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with 
the view that they favor the politically powerful”); see generally James M. 
Buchanan, Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory 
and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II 11 (James 
M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984) (discussing public choice theory). 
 106. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 224 (explaining the welfare economic theory 
that emerged in the 1930s); see also ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF 
WELFARE 3–22 (4th ed. 1932) (describing welfare economic theory as a form of 
“republicanism” or “civic virtue” suggesting that government officials should act 
in the interest of the pubic good rather than their own personal interests). 
 107. See generally Larkin, supra note 23, at 224 (providing definitions of the 
Market Failure Theory).  
 108. See id. at 225 (describing perceived flaws of Public Interest Theory). 
 109. See id. at 225 (“Mistaken government interventions can be more difficult 
to remedy than market imperfections. The Constitution makes the passage of 
legislation difficult, so, once enacted, laws do not fade away. Absent an expiration 
date, laws remain in effect until they are repealed or held unconstitutional.”); see 
also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson, Co., 346 U.S. 100, 113–14 (1953) 
(stating that local laws should be respected “in the interest of peace and order” 
and to uphold the sovereignty of the locality). 
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them may last forever.”110 Secondly, Market Failure Theory also 
aggrandizes the motives of public officials, assuming that they 
always act in the best interest of the nation, despite presence of 
evidence to the contrary.111 Finally, Public Interest Theory does 
not explain, especially in the occupational licensing context, that 
consumers and private individuals do not urge governments to 
adopt licensing regimes. 112 Contrarily, private firms request that 
licensing regimes be established, the opposite of what Public 
Interest Theory predicts.113 
E. Who Benefits from Occupational Licensing? 
Licensing regulation is justified by claims that these statues 
improve the health and safety of both the consumer and the 
practitioner.114 The objective of licensing is to shield the public 
from potentially incompetent or dishonest practitioners and to 
                                                                                                     
 110. See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 23, at 225.  
 111. See id. at 225–26 (discussing the “normative wishings” phenomena, 
assuming that public officials act in the nation’s interest, even with evidence 
indicating otherwise); see also Douglas Ginsberg, A New Economic Theory of 
Regulation: Rent Extraction Rather than Rent Creation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1771 
(1997) (“Once upon a time, people have believed that the government regulated 
various industries in the ‘the public interest.’”); see also JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE 
GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 124 (3d ed. 2008) (“Reformers rarely acknowledged that much economic 
legislation, although couched in terms of general benefits, served selfish special 
interests.”).  
 112. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 226 (explaining the irony of Public Interest 
Theory in its application to occupational licensing); see also Lawrence M. 
Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: A Legal 
and Social Study, 53 CAL. L. REV. 487, 503 (1965) (“It has been sufficiently 
demonstrated how much the licensing urge flowed from the needs of the licensed 
occupations. The state did not impose ‘friendly’ licensing; rather, this licensing 
was actively sought by the regulated.”); see also Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of 
Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 11 (1976) (“Licensing has only 
infrequently been imposed upon an occupation against its wishes.”). 
 113. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 226 (“Finally, Public Interest Theory does 
not explain a curious and stubborn fact: Private individuals rarely urge 
governments to adopt licensing regimes, but private firms often do—conduct that 
is the exact opposite of what Public Interest Theory predicts.”). 
 114. See id. at 211 (“A state adopts registration, certification, and license 
requirements under its ‘police power’ the inherent sovereign authority to regulate 
private conducts for the purpose of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of 
its residents.”). 
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assure that practitioners have at least a minimum standard of 
proficiency within the profession.115 Further, licensing protects 
consumers, and the public generally, against potentially 
dangerous practitioners.116 This is especially relevant to 
occupations where it is difficult for consumers to evaluate the 
quality of the provider beforehand or when the evaluation of the 
specified profession requires a certain degree of expertise.117 As 
professions become more specialized, a certain level of expertise, 
education, and training is essential to the profession.118 Licensing 
requirements compensate for the “information asymmetry” 
between practitioners and consumers.119 
Licensing requirements therefore reduce “consumer fear” of 
dissatisfaction or injury by a service. In theory, advocates suggest 
that this results in enhanced consumer demand for licensed 
services.120 Licensing requirements have also been found to 
                                                                                                     
 115. See SHIMBERG, supra note 18, at 11 (“Although there has been a marked 
increase in public discussion about occupational licensing, many people, including 
active professionals, do not fully understand how the system works, how it affects 
consumers, what critics and defenders are saying, and what remedies are being 
proposed to deal with alleged shortcomings.”).  
 116. See NAAG, supra note 17 (“One objective of licensing is to protect the 
public from incompetent or dishonest practitioners, and to assure the public of a 
minimum standard of proficiency in the licensed occupation.”). 
 117. See WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 11 (explaining when occupational 
licensing is valued to identify qualified professionals).  
 118. See NAAG, supra note 17, at 33 (admitting the importance and value in 
training programs, education, and certification in preparing individuals for 
certain professions). 
 119. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 222 (“The classic justification is information 
asymmetry. Consumers lack the knowledge and expertise required to judge the 
qualifications of different service-providers and lack the time necessary to acquire 
such knowledge and expertise. Licensing requirements compensate for that 
shortcoming by setting minimum qualifications.”); see also Kenneth Arrrow, 
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. L. REV. 
941, 946, 966 (1963) (“When there is uncertainty, information or knowledge 
becomes a commodity. Like other commodities, it has a cost of production and a 
cost of transmission . . . . These are designed to reduce the uncertainty in the 
mind of the consumer as to the quality of product insofar as this is possible.”). 
 120. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 223 (“Because consumers are generally risk 
averse, licensing requirements may reduce consumer fear of being dissatisfied or 
injured by a particular service, which would enhance consumer demand, thereby 
benefitting an entire community as consumers purchase additional local 
services.”); see also Kleiner, supra note 39, at 192 (“The existence of licenses may 
minimize consumer uncertainty over the quality of the licensed service and 
increase the overall demand for the service”). 
284 24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 261 (2017) 
encourage service-providers to invest in additional training to 
market more favorably to consumers.121 Licensing practices can 
therefore elevate the prominence of the profession as a whole.122 
As a result, studies have shown that occupational licensing 
increases employment prospects of licensed workers and can raise 
their wages as much as fifteen percent and enhance other benefits, 
such as health coverage and retirement packages.123 
Licensing has often been sought by the industry in question 
itself; arguing that these regimes ensure high-quality 
professionals, continuing education requirements, as well as some 
suggestion that licensed individuals earn better wages. As 
discussed in the next section, however, these benefits to forming 
occupational licensing regimes are called into question.124 More 
                                                                                                     
 121. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 223 (“Also, a licensing requirement could 
encourage service-providers to invest in their human capital through, for 
instance, additional education or training, because they will not fear being 
underpriced by less qualified rivals.”); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890–91 (explaining that vertical restraints are 
sometimes necessary to enhance competition within the occupation to prevent 
outside completion). 
 122. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 223 (suggesting quality standards may 
prevent market failure due to uncertainty of information and may be desirable 
when a higher price attracts a variety of suppliers). 
 123. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 4–6 (describing 
studies that suggest that occupational licensing improves employment prospects 
and provides additional monetary incentives); see also Kleiner & Krueger, supra 
note 30, at 685 (finding that licensed professions earn wages fifteen percent 
higher than their competitive non-licensed counterparts). 
 124. See SHIMBERG, supra note 18, at 6 (quoting Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse 
of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 11 (1976)) (explaining the 
detriments of licensing requirements). Benjamin Shimberg articulates: 
[T]he licensing has been eagerly sought—always on the purported 
ground that licensure protects the uninformed public against 
incompetence and dishonesty, but invariably with the consequence 
that members of the licensed group become protected from the new 
comers. That restricting access is the real purpose and not merely a 
side effect can scarcely be doubted. Licensing, imposed ostensibly to 
protect the public almost always impedes only those who desire to 
enter the occupation or profession; those already in practice remain 
entrenched without a demonstration of fitness or probity. The 
self-interested proponents of a new licensing law generally constitute 
a more effective political form than the citizens who, if aware of the 
matter at all, have no special interest which moves them to organize in 
opposition. 
Id. 
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often than not, these regimes are created to meet self-serving 
ends.125 
Undoubtedly, heightened and continued education 
requirements do improve the quality of professionals, benefitting 
consumers without creating undue barriers to consumer access.126 
It follows that the practice would be exclusionary to individuals 
that are unqualified to work. In theory, the requirements found in 
licensing statutes should be based on careful analysis of the 
occupation in question to determine what object minimum level of 
knowledge, skill, ability, or other characteristics are required to 
meet the demands of the profession.127 Considering that one of the 
strongest arguments in favor of licensing includes consumer 
safety, it follows that the standards should demonstrate a 
commitment to ensuring that heightened safety standards remain 
once admitted into the licensing regime.128  
Surprisingly, there is limited data indicating what measures 
should determine the minimum entry requirements.129 Scholars 
suggest that the requirements found in licensing statues are more 
often dictated by custom.130 Further, despite the emphasis on the 
applicant’s dedication to consumer safety, including a standard 
concerning “good moral character,” there is no standard within the 
statute that applies to current practitioners.131 In fact, studies 
suggest that the rise of occupational licensing has in fact reduced 
employment and increased prices and wages of licensed workers 
                                                                                                     
 125. See id. (describing the barriers to entry, transaction costs, and special 
interests that emerge due to licensing requirements).  
 126. See id. at 35 (discussing the function of occupational licensing to prevent 
unqualified individuals from practicing). 
 127. See Besley & Burgess, supra note 15, at 35 (“Many of the requirements 
found in licensing statutes are there by dint of custom. They are seldom based on 
a careful analysis of the job to determine objectively what minimum level of 
knowledge, skill, ability, or other characteristics are necessary for practice in the 
given occupation.”).  
 128. See id. at 35–36 (questioning why the same high standards are not 
applied to individuals already in the profession). 
 129. See id. at 35 (“Seldom has research been conducted to establish minimum 
standards.”). 
 130. See id. (explaining that licensing statutes tend to be unspecific and 
dictated by custom). 
 131. See id. (“Current petitioners are usually exempted from new statutory 
requirements.”). 
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more often than it has improved the quality and safety of 
service.132 
F. Who is Hurt by Occupational Licensing?133 
Ostensibly, licensing requirements protect public health and 
safety, and from the risk of hiring an unqualified practitioner.134 
Theoretically, if occupational licensing strictly served as a 
protection for public health and safety measures as well as a 
protection against faulty or corrupt practitioners, these groups 
would prove extremely beneficial to society.135 While some of the 
professions should require licensing requirements, strict 
regulatory overreach should be deemed unnecessary for many of 
the service-based licensing agreements common throughout the 
states today. 
Licensing establishment systems appear to do more harm 
than good, especially for low- to moderate-income workers, and the 
difficulties in entering an occupation often do not align with any 
public health or safety risk it may possess.136 Citing protectionist 
                                                                                                     
 132. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 6 (citing economic 
studies that show that occupational licensing reduces employment and failed to 
improve the quality and safety of services); see also Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 
30, at 685 (showing evidence where occupational licensing reduced employment, 
did not increase wages for workers, and did not improve service quality). 
 133. See Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion a Legitimate State 
Interest? Four Recent Cases Test the Boundaries, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023 
(2005) (exploring four case studies which raise “the issue of whether regulations 
designed for no other purpose than to protect political insiders from fair economic 
competition meet the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 134. See Martin Austermuhle, U.S. Senator Takes Aim at D.C. Over . . . . 
Occupational Licensing, WAMU.ORG (July 14, 2016), https://wamu.org 
/story/16/07/14/us_senator_takes_aim_at_dc_over_occupational_licensing/ 
(“[T]he purpose of licensing requirements is to protect public health and 
safety . . . . What about truck drivers, athletic trainers, hair stylists, florists . . . ? 
It’s hard to see why people who want to work in these jobs should . . . obtain 
government permission before they can legally be hired.”) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 135. See generally COX & FOSTER, supra note 27, at 4–5 (discussing the 
rationale for occupational licensing in addition to the consequences of 
occupational licensing).  
 136. See WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 13 (“Most research does not find 
that licensing improves quality or public health and safety . . . .”); see also id. at v 
(“Many occupational licensing schemes do not appear to realize their goal of 
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public health and safety issues,137 licensing measures have come 
to outweigh these concerns and have caused gross reductions in 
economic growth and entrepreneurship, and, in fact, 
disproportionately burden blue collar workers, young applicants, 
minorities, and immigrants.138 In practice, licensing requirement 
created restrictive anti-competitive industries across the states.139 
Notably, these licensing regimes have come to harm the very group 
that they were created to protect: the consumers themselves.140 
The function of occupational licensing boards has come to 
serve limits on entrance into the profession, allowing members of 
the trade to avoid competition and raise prices. Often, the change 
in price does not correspond with an improvement of service.141 
Considering that these boards are self-regulated, the efficacy of the 
system has been called into question. One scholar explained: 
If professional groups are made the custodians of 
professional licensing, then the question should be asked, 
“who guards these guardians?” Since licensing bodies 
                                                                                                     
increasing the quality of these professional’s services.”); see also Kleiner, supra 
note 54, at 48–52, 56 (“Overall, few of these studies demand quality show 
significant benefits of occupational regulation.”). 
 137. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 6 (“Indeed, economic 
studies have demonstrated far more cases where occupational licensing has 
reduced employment and increased prices and wages of licensed workers than 
where it has improved the quality and safety of services.”).  
 138. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 5 (describing why these groups 
are often the victim of these restrictions and the lopsided nature of the 
legislation). 
 139. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (framing the problem of 
occupational licensing for American workers due to economic restraints as well 
an anti-competition measures); see also HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 
22, at 12 (explaining that licensing limits the pool of new workers as well as 
consumer access to competition, therefore creating a selected pool of individuals 
unduly protected). 
 140. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 13 (“In fact, standard 
economic models imply that the restrictions from occupational licensing can 
result in up to 2.85 million fewer jobs nationwide, with an annual cost to 
consumers of $203 billion.”). 
 141. Id.; see also Larkin, supra note 23, at 236 (explaining the possibility for 
a decrease in quality of service when competition is hindered); see also Hoover v. 
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 584 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[P]rivate regulation 
of market entry, prices, or output may be designed to confer monopoly profits on 
members of an industry at the expense of the consuming public . . . . [P]rivate 
parties have used licensing to advance their own interests in restraining 
competition at the expense of the public interest.”). 
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have a public role, then the issue becomes one of ensuring 
the responsibility of these bodies. In no avenue of life can 
government give a blank check to any group of men. Nor 
should one be given to the professions. To the degree to 
which licensing boards exercise a public function, no 
phase of their operation can ever be immune from public 
scrutiny.142 
Disciplinary actions are rarely ever pursued, despite the extensive 
investigative, prosecutorial, adjudicatory, and punitive powers 
typically released by these professions.143 Rather than increase 
services to consumers and service providers, the industry itself 
benefits the most from licensing regimes, especially when demand 
for the service is “inelastic,” when there are limited alternatives, 
or when the industry can define qualifications.144 
Active members on the licensing boards are the main 
beneficiaries occupational licensing professions. They set limits to 
entry, therefore insulating themselves from competition, 
burdening professionals seeking entrance, and raising prices of the 
product, a burden born by the consumer.145 These boards use their 
unchecked power to make it more difficult to enter the 
                                                                                                     
 142. R.J. Frye, Government and Licensing, UNIV. OF ALA. BUREAU OF PUB. 
ADMIN. 76 (1958), reprinted in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN PRICE MAINTENANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL 
LICENSING 33 (The National Association of Attorneys General: Committee on the 
Office of Attorney General, June 1975).  
 143. See TESKE, supra note 41, at 135 (explaining self-regulation as it relates 
to licensing boards and the lack-luster process of administrative review). Paul 
Teske also notes: 
Such self-regulation left a limited role—or even none—for the type of 
bureaucratic commissions and agencies that are influential 
independent sources of policy and implementation in the other areas of 
state regulation . . . . [T]he boards, with most appointments usually 
made by governors based on nominations from the sate professional 
associations, until recently were composed almost exclusively of 
members of the regulated profession. As a result, disciplinary action 
against professionals was quite rare, despite the fact that boards often 
hold impressive investigative, prosecutorial, adjudicatory, and 
punishment powers on paper. 
Id. at 135. 
 144. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 237 (describing the anticompetitive nature 
of the licensing boards). 
 145. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 6 (citing the limited 
benefits of occupational regulation for consumers). 
THE LAND OF THE FREE? 289 
occupation,146 to limit price competition, or limit the number of 
services available to the consumer.147 Many boards have used their 
power to engage in anticompetitive measures, making entrance 
into the market incredibly burdensome.148 These measures include 
specific training requirements, including hourly or daily 
minimums, examinations, courses of studies, and fees.149 For low- 
to moderate-income workers, these require an average of $209 in 
entrance fees, an examination, and almost a year of education and 
training.150 
These entrance measures prove prohibitive to entry, especially 
for lower-income practitioners.151 Many licensed professions 
throughout the states are well-suited for individuals entering or 
re-entering the economy, typically composed of young workers, 
immigrants, minorities, or blue collar individuals.152 These 
entrance requirements vary by state. In Arizona, a state 
infamously ranked as one of the most “onerously licensed state for 
low- and moderate-income workers” cost of entry nears $800, 
requires an average of almost 1,500 days of education and 
experience, and requires passage of two exams.153 By creating 
restrictive entry criteria including these education and training 
                                                                                                     
 146. See id. at 5 (“[E]conomic studies have demonstrated far more cases where 
occupational licensing has reduced employment and increased prices and wages 
of licensed workers than where it has improved the quality and safety of 
services.”). 
 147. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1095–96 (“Licensing boards are 
largely dominated by active members of their respective industries who meet to 
agree on ways to limit the entry of new competitors.”). 
 148. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, at 1096 (highlighting the corruption of 
exclusionary occupational licensing boards). 
 149. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 6 (articulating the forms of 
obtaining an occupational license for a profession); see also HAMILTON DISCUSSION 
PAPER, supra note 22, at 11–13 (describing lengthy training requirements for 
different licensed professions). 
 150. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 6 (noting the significant impact 
these regimes have on workers traditionally considered “blue collar” workers). 
 151. See id. at 20 (discussing the hardship that these requirements have for 
this group of individuals). 
 152. See id. (explaining as an example, that carpenters and cabinet makers, 
licensed in thirty states, on average require nearly $300 worth of entrance fees, 
passage of an exam, and 450 days of training and education.) 
 153. See id. at 40 (noting that Arizona is among the top five most burdensome 
states for occupational licensing, in addition to Hawaii, Arkansas, Nevada, and 
Florida). 
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requirements, the boards control the market, thus creating 
significant final benefits for the board and for the members of the 
industry. As a result, occupations requiring a license in these 
states perpetuate their licensure to an unfair advantage, using 
measures to “choke out the competition” and demanding “higher 
prices without delivering improved products or services.”154 
Scholars have gone so far as to suggest that these actions violate 
the Sherman Act,155 but have gone unpunished, insulated by the 
act’s failure to mention actions sanctioned by the state, and 
therefore outside of the reach of the act itself.156 
In addition, occupational licensing requirement restrictions 
result in more than two million fewer jobs nationwide, costing 
consumers more than $100 billion annually.157 This is a result of 
the burdensome entry requirements, that many skilled low- to 
moderate-income workers simply cannot afford.158 In addition, 
studies suggest that proof indicating quality enhancements do not 
in fact offset price increases from licensing measures, especially in 
positions that do not require unique qualifications that could pose 
a danger to the health or safety of the public, such as cosmetology, 
frog farming, or casket-making.159 Low- to moderate-income 
                                                                                                     
 154. See Dick Carpenter & Chip Mellor, Editorial, Breaking Down 
‘Bottleneckers:’ Form Music Therapists to Funeral Directors, Licensing Schemes 
Keep Out Competition, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2016, 3:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/breaking-down-bottleneckers-1479680470 (scrutinizing occupational 
licensing regulations that constrain economic growth and indicating that despite 
bipartisan support for the reform, that the reform will likely face opposition from 
members of the licensed occupations) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 155. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
 156. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1096 n.5 (“The Sherman Act makes 
no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain 
state action or official action directed by a state.” (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 
U.S. 341, 351 (1943))). 
 157. See generally HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 6 
(describing the economic burden that occupational licensing pushes onto the 
consumer); see also id. at 1099 (discussing the economic harm associated with 
allowing professions to control their own licensing regimes).  
 158. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 9 (outlining the entry 
requirements prohibitive to low- to moderate income workers and the hypocrisy 
of the requirements, considering the nature of many of these licensed professions).  
 159. See WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 13 (highlighting the increased 
harm facing licensed occupations that target service industries, or lower income 
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workers pursuing the service-based professions—such as a 
cosmetologist or cabinet maker—face a much different reality than 
those pursuing higher-paid licensed professions.160 These 
individuals often do not have the same resources as those pursuing 
a career in medicine or the law.161 
In addition, the occupations that drive up the statistic 
suggesting that licensed professions receive higher wages include 
occupations such as lawyer, dentist, or architect.162 The reality is 
that there is no significant difference in wages between unlicensed 
and licensed professionals, traditionally considered to be blue 
collar.163 In fact, if an occupation is unlicensed in other states, if 
the regulatory burdens are high compared to other states, or if the 
burdens are high compared to other occupation with even greater 
safety risks, it is suggested that the licensing regime is an 
unnecessary or needlessly burdensome licensing scheme 
unjustified by legitimate health and safety concerns.164 This is 
often the case for this pool of professions. 
Licensing does not guarantee improvements in service quality 
nor does it protect the consumers from health or safety risks.165 In 
                                                                                                     
professions). 
 160. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 7 (articulating the variance 
between states in licensure requirements, as well as, the variance in necessity 
between the types of professions low- to moderate-income individuals are 
pursuing and calling into question the need for such severe burdens). 
 161. See id. (“Such licensure hurdles are likely exceptionally burdensome for 
lower-income workers, particularly compared to higher-paid occupations like 
physicians, attorneys and the like . . . . [T]ypically [lower-income workers] have 
fewer resources than those pursuing high-income occupations.”). 
 162. See id. (noting that the individuals that do clear the financial and 
training burdens typically make “markedly less” annually than the national 
average for the profession or for lower class workers generally). 
 163. See id. at 11 (discussing the large demographic of individuals seeking or 
engaged in licensed occupations who have a college degree or less). 
 164. See id. at 35–36 (providing a series of threshold questions suggesting 
that a licensing scheme is unnecessary or needlessly burdensome). 
 165. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 2002) (arguing that 
nothing prevents licensed practitioners from selling poor quality goods at a high 
price and that licensing requirements bear no rational relationship to increasing 
the quality of a good or service); see also id. at 8 (suggesting that there is little 
evidence that government licenses protects public health and safety or improve 
the quality or product of services, but rather that licensing actually reduces 
opportunity and increases consumer cost); see also Klein, supra note 23, at 429 
(“Occupational licensing does not guarantee public safety or product quality.”). 
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fact, while occupational practitioners often lobby state legislators 
on behalf of their licensing groups through appeals for the 
protection of public health or safety, these claims are often 
erroneous and fail to produce any concrete evidence of how lack of 
licensing will lead to consumer harm.166 In fact, while licensing 
may be beneficial for those that ultimately obtain a license to 
practice, the cost comes at the expense of consumers, who face 
reduced service opportunity and higher price points.167 Economists 
have found that the effect of licensing on price and quality of 
service cost consumers up to nearly $139 billion a year.168 In 
addition, this high price of licensing for consumers have garnered 
limited impact on the quality of service received by consumers.169 
In sum, while occupational licensing should theoretically protect 
the consumer from a variety of dangers, studies have continuously 
concluded that currently occupational licensing may not actually 
improve consumer protection as well as once perceived.170 
In recent years, the public has been alerted to the concerns 
attached to occupational licensing measures and has called for a 
“common-sense changes in the Division of Professional 
Licensure”171 necessary to improve the business climate across the 
                                                                                                     
 166. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 31–32 (“State agencies have . . . 
been unable to document a need for licensing [certain professions], and such 
claims of harm have also failed independent scrutiny.”). 
 167. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 12 (“Most of the 
literature has shown that licensing is beneficial for those fortunate enough or able 
to obtain a license, and that these benefits come mainly at the expense of 
consumers, who are confronted with reduced availability of services and higher 
prices.”). 
 168. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1098 (citing Morris Kleiner, leading 
economist on occupational licensing, regarding the high price of licensing for 
consumers). 
 169. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 15 (explaining a 
variety of studies on a range of licensed occupations that found that these 
occupations provided the same or worse value of service for the consumer). 
 170. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, at 15 (“Collectively, these studies 
indicate that occupational licensing as it is commonly practices may not improve 
consumer protection.”). 
 171. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1098 (suggesting that politicians and 
the mainstream media have noticed and begun to campaign for the reform on 
behalf of the public and their constituents); see also Press Release, Massachusetts 
Office of the Governor, Governor Patrick Builds on Regulatory Reform Success; 
Files Legislation to Improve Business Climate for Licensed Professionals (Jan. 7, 
2013), http://www.maroundtable.com/aroundTable/1301/RegulatoryReform.pdf 
[hereinafter Builds Press Release] (proposing a list of changes to the licensing 
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states and defend against excessive licensing.172 The ALLOW Act 
provides a targeted solution to the anticompetitive impact of 
unjustifiable occupational licensing requirements.173 
III. The ALLOW Act 
The Alternatives to Licensing that Lower Obstacles to Work 
Act, or the ALLOW Act, seeks to make targeted changes to federal 
licensure policy through the reduction for unnecessary licensing 
requirements.174 Senate Bill S.3158 was introduced to the Senate 
on July 12, 2016, sponsored by Senators Mike Lee (R-UT) (Lee) and 
Ben Sasse (R-NE) (Sasse) and referred to the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.175 Representatives 
Mark Meadows (R-NC) and Dave Brat introduced the bill before 
the House of Representatives, H.R. 6312, before the House 
Oversight and Government Reform, Armed Services, and Natural 
Resources Committee, on November 14, 2016.176 H.R. 6312 was 
referred to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel on December 
1, 2016.177 The bills in both houses are nearly identical, and the 
Senate bill will be widely referenced for the purposes of this Note. 
The ALLOW Act seeks to make targeted changes to federal 
licensure policy by reducing occupational licensing requirements 
on federal installments as well as to implement a model to review 
and reduce occupational licensing regimes in the District of 
                                                                                                     
structure in Massachusetts to improve the economic health and business climate 
of the state) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 172. See Builds Press Release, supra note 171, at 1 (“Governor Patrick today 
announced legislation to streamline and improve the licensing process and 
business climate for thousands of professional licensees throughout 
Massachusetts.”). 
 173. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (framing the anticompetitive 
regime created by licensing boards and outlining the solutions provided by the 
act). 
 174. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 207 (stating that “[a]n individual may 
engage in a lawful occupation without being subject to occupational regulations 
that are—(1) arbitrary; or (2) unnecessary and substantially burdensome”). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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Columbia.178 The bill establishes that the federal government may 
establish an individual’s authorization to have their license or 
certification honored in employment on a military installation 
located on federally-owned land.179 The bill seeks to: 
[P]romote economic opportunity for military families, to 
facilitate workforce attachment for military spouses in 
their chosen occupation across multiple geographical 
postings, to reduce barriers to work on military 
installations, to amend the District of Columbia Code to 
promote greater freedom in the practice of regulated 
occupations, to combat abuse of occupational licensing 
laws by economic incumbents, to promote competition, 
encourage innovation, protect consumers, and promote 
compliance with Federal antitrust law, and for other 
purposes.180 
If Congress passes this legislation, the District will hopefully 
be the first of many jurisdictions to revoke restrictive occupational 
licensing regimes. In addition, the legislation could provide 
economic relief for military families across the nation, who face a 
heightened risk of falling victim to the expense and restrictions of 
entering the same licensed occupations within their state. 
                                                                                                     
 178. See Meadows Press Release, supra note 18 (quoting Representative 
Meadows, “[I]t’s very clear that many of the rules and requirements go beyond 
protecting health and safety standards and instead serve as a barrier to jobs . . . . 
[T]his bill can refocus our licensing requirements on only the most pertinent 
situations”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); see also Press Release, Office of Senator Mike Lee, Sens. Lee, Sasse 
Introduce Alternatives to Licensing that Lower Obstacles to Work (ALLOW) Act 
(July 12, 2016), http://www.lee.senate.gov /public/index.cfm/2016/7/sens-lee-sasse 
-introduce-alternatives-to-licensing-that-lower-obstacles-to-work-allow-act 
(“Sens. Mike Lee (R-UT) and Ben Sasse (R-NE) introduced legislation . . . that 
would make it easier for many Americans to begin(“Sens. Mike Lee (R-UT) and 
Ben Sasse (R-NE) introduce legislation  . . . that would make it easier for many 
Americans to begin work in their chosen field by reducing unnecessary licensing 
burdens.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 179. ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 101. 
 180. Id. 
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A. Importance of the Act 
The ALLOW Act’s primary goal is to reform occupational 
licensing in the District of Columbia and on other federal property, 
such as national parks and military bases.181 The bills in both 
houses of Congress suggest that requiring the government’s 
permission to work through obtainment of a license should be 
reserved for occupations that potentially pose true threats to public 
health and safety.182 
Most importantly, the ALLOW Act will assist the federal 
government in removing “a government-imposed barrier to 
opportunity.”183 In a statement released by cosponsors, Lee and 
Sasse, the Senators stress that the legislation would lower the 
burden for many Americans by allowing them to begin work in 
their chosen fields, without the constraints of licensing regimes.184 
Lee described the underlying motivation for the passage of the act: 
The principle at the heart of the American economic 
system is equality of opportunity. In practice, this mean 
eliminating all forms of legal privilege and political 
favoritism, so that the economy rewards hard work, 
initiative, good judgement, and personal 
responsibility . . . . Unfortunately, too many localities 
have allowed licensing requirements to become a barrier 
to prevent younger and less fortunate workers from 
getting better and higher-paying jobs.185 
                                                                                                     
 181. See Jared Meyer, New Congress Can Limit Occupational Licensing, 
FORBES (Jan. 23, 2017, 4:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredmeyer/2017/ 
01/23/new-congress-can-limit-occupational-licensing/#7009587e3cd1 [hereinafter 
Meyer] (describing the reasons for the Act and the importance of the shifting 
viewpoints regarding occupational licensing) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 182. See id. (interviewing the House Representative Meadows (R-NC) 
regarding the changes that the ALLOW Act proposes). 
 183. See id. (explaining that licensing is supposed to be the last resort of 
regulators, reserved only for professions that pose a serious potential harm to 
public health and safety). 
 184. See Press Release, Office of Sen. Mike Lee, Sens. Lee, Sasse Introduce 
Alternatives to Licensing that Lower Obstacles to Work (ALLOW) Act (July 12, 
2016), http://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/7/sens-lee-sasse-introduc 
e-alternatives-to-licensing-that-lower-obstacles-to-work-allow-act (describing the 
introduction of ALLOW Act legislation and the primary goals of the Act) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 185. See id. (discussing one of the motivating factors in pursuing occupational 
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To achieve these means and promote America’s entrepreneurial 
spirit, the Act leverages Congress’s Article I authority over federal 
enclaves to advance models for licensing reforms.186 By rethinking 
the approach to occupational licensing regulations, Lee expresses 
his hope that the Act will help the American economy to grow and 
make “room for the full range of human talents, aspirations and 
imaginations to flourish”187 by rethinking occupational licensing 
laws and to ensure “that our economy is set up to benefit the hard 
work of all Americans.”188 
B. What the ALLOW Act does for the District of Columbia and 
Federal Lands 
The focus of the ALLOW Act centers around reforming 
occupational licensing requirements within the District of 
Columbia,189 with the hopes that it will serve as a legislative 
reformative model throughout the states.190 The Act will expressly 
limit the creation of new occupational licensing requirements in 
the District of Columbia and federal property, such as national 
parks and military bases.191 
The Act seeks to limit creation of occupational licensing 
requirements in the District, and other federal property, only to 
circumstances where the profession may truly affect public health, 
                                                                                                     
licensing reform measures). 
 186. See generally id. (describing the ALLOW act as a model to states for 
occupational licensing reform).  
 187. See Senator Mike Lee, Remarks on Occupational Licensing, The ALLOW 
Act at The Heritage Foundation (July 12, 2016), https://www.lee.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm/2016/7/remarks-on-occupational-licensing-the-allow-act 
(remarking on the importance of the Act to encourage and promote the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the American people) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Meyer, supra note 178 (describing the primary purpose of the 
ALLOW Act and the impact it may have on the District of Columbia). 
 190. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (explaining one of the key goals 
of the Act as it is related to reforms in the District of Columbia). 
 191. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 201 (describing the scope of the Act as 
recognizing any state occupational certification as valid on federal lands, 
including military installations and the District of Columbia).  
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safety, or welfare.192 In doing so, the Act mandates policy limiting 
enforcements of license requirements only to services that meet 
standards expressly identified in the statute.193 The Act also 
promotes less restrictive requirements including certification and 
regulation practices and establishes a dedicated office within the 
District Attorney’s Office to establish active supervision of the 
occupational boards.194 
The Act also calls for legislative oversight of licensed 
industries. Specifically, the act calls for a “sunrise review” of any 
new proposed licensing requirements, calling for a full evaluation 
of any of the possible impacts on workers or economic growth, as 
well as an analysis of whether the less restrictive regulations could 
be applicable.195 The Act calls for a sunset review as well, applying 
similar analytical frameworks to existing occupational licensing 
laws in the District.196 Together, these processes seek to review 
existing occupational licensing laws over a five-year period and 
implement new proposals for appropriate, less burdensome 
alternatives.197 While only applicable to the District of Columbia, 
military bases and federal enclaves, the drafters of the legislature 
envision the proposed Act as a model for state reform.198 
                                                                                                     
 192. See Meyer, supra note 178 (quoting Rep. Meadows on the goals of the Act 
on federal lands). 
 193. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 206(b)–(c) (outlining the guideposts of 
what may professions may remain licensed and the review process). 
 194. See id. § 205 (describing the functions of the oversight offices within the 
District Attorney’s office).  
 195. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (describing the sunrise and 
sunset reviews of current and proposed occupational licensing professions tasked 
to the legislature to consider other less restrictive, regulatory means); see also 
ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 206(b)(2)(A) (outlining the factors to consider during 
the sunrise review of new proposed licensing requirements).  
 196. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 206(c)(2) (listing factors to consider 
doing the sunset review process). 
 197. See id. §§ 204–06 (discussing the policies regarding occupational 
licensure, the duties of the office of supervision of occupational boards, and time 
tables periodic analysis of occupational regulations). 
 198. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (“The Act: Serves as a model 
for reform in the states by limiting the creation of occupational licenses 
requirements in the District only to those circumstances in which it is the least 
restrictive means of protecting the public health, safety or welfare.”). 
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C. Benefits for Military Families 
Veterans and military families face especially unique 
challenges in the labor market.199 For the families of military 
personnel, frequent moves combined with varying occupational 
licensing requirements across state lines make it exceedingly 
difficult and expensive.200 These issues also affect former military 
personnel.201 Veterans often struggle to find jobs in the private 
sector, despite their valuable military experience that is oftentimes 
relevant and transferrable to high growth civilian jobs.202 Many 
occupational licensing boards refuse to recognize or transfer the 
education and experience obtained in service, requiring veterans 
to invest in specific educational and training institutions to secure 
civilian credentials and licensing.203 Military families are more 
than ten times more likely to have been moved across state lines 
in the past year compared to their civilian counterparts, and nearly 
thirty-five percent of military spouses in the work force hold 
occupations in professions that commonly require licensing or 
certification.204 
The ALLOW Act serves essential functions for members of 
military families. If enacted, the Act would provide significant 
                                                                                                     
 199. See id. (explaining how military spouses are effectively blocked from 
pursuing their chosen field of work “[t]hirty-five percent of military spouses in the 
labor force work in professions that require a state issued license and they are 10 
times more likely to have moved across State lines in the last year”).  
 200. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MILITARY SKILL FOR AMERICA’S 
FUTURE: LEVERAGING MILITARY SERVICE AND EXPERIENCE TO PUT VETERANS AND 
MILITARY SPOUSES BACK TO WORK 1 (May 31, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/veterans_report_5-31-2012.pdf [hereinafter 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT] (describing the regular challenges that military 
and their families face in obtaining employment) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 201. Id. 
 202. See id. (discussing the difficulty veterans face when looking to transfer 
their credentials to the private sector). 
 203. See id. (explaining the historical lack of opportunity faced by veterans in 
obtaining civilian credentials and licensing requirements).  
 204. See id. at 8 (noting that 15.2 percent of military spouses moved across 
state lines annually, compared to 1.1 percent of civilian spouses and that nearly 
35 percent of military spouses in the work force are trained in professions that 
commonly require occupational licensing); see also ALLOW Act Summary, supra 
note 20 (noting the relatively high percent of military spouses trained in 
professions that typically require an occupational license).  
THE LAND OF THE FREE? 299 
protection for military families, often burdened by inconsistent 
licensing requirements or lack of reciprocity for professions across 
state lines, as they travel to join their spouses at their respective 
stations.205 
The Act seeks to harmonize occupational entry requirements 
on military bases by actively endorsing reciprocity between states 
and baes to promote workforce attachment for military spouses.206 
In doing so, the ALLOW Act aims to endorse “occupational licenses 
and certifications granted by any State, regardless of whether the 
military installation is located in the issuing State.”207 The license 
or certification will remain honored so long as the license has not 
expired, been revoked, or been suspended by the issuing state and 
that there are no outstanding disciplinary or enforcement 
proceedings posed against the individual brought by the certifying 
authority or licensing board.208 
IV. Is the ALLOW Act Constitutionally Defensible 
There is wide spread recognition of the economic harms 
associated with overt occupational licensing boards and 
professions.209 The power of occupational licensing regimes has 
been recognized by many politicians, and there has been 
widespread bipartisan support to address these oppressive 
regimes.210 The ALLOW Act takes an important step in the 
direction of occupational licensing reform in this country, reducing 
unnecessary regulatory overreach and restrictions to hundreds of 
                                                                                                     
 205. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (explaining the burdens faced 
by military families in particular). 
 206. See id. (discussing the endorsement of military bases to accept 
occupational licenses from other states). 
 207. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 101(a) (mandating that military bases 
and other federal lands, including the district, honor the valid licenses of other 
States). 
 208. See id. § 101(a)(1)–(2) (outlining reasons when a license from another 
State may not be honored). 
 209. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1099 (pointing out the recognition of 
the potential harms associated with occupational licensing). 
 210. See id. at 1098–99 (naming politicians, including Massachusetts 
Governor Deval Patrick, Florida Governor Rick Scott, and Former First Lady 
Michelle Obama, who have taken stands against excessive licensing on the state 
and level and attempted to implement measures to combat the practice). 
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professions. As written, the ALLOW Act is Constitutionally 
defensible in its authority to implement the act both in 
Washington, D.C., on military bases, and on federally owned lands. 
Licensing boards and local officials alike are not thrilled about 
the prospect of reducing licensing requirements. It is 
understandable that licensing boards would be opposed to such 
reform, as their ability to control their markets within the states 
would be reduced. 
The Interior Design Lobby has been particularly vocal in 
opposition to reducing any movement towards reducing licensing 
requirements.211 Interior designers near the top of the list of the 
most difficult occupation to enter in the three states and the 
District of Columbia where practice requires a license.212 Aspiring 
interior designers in these jurisdictions require passage of a 
national exam, pay an average of nearly $400 in entrance fees and 
devote six years to education and internship requirements before 
beginning to work.213 Multiple state commissions have conducted 
studies and produced findings that “there is simply no need to 
license interior designers.”214 The Interior Design Lobby is 
notorious for waging a thirty year campaign within state 
legislatures, seeking greater regulation and establishment of 
licensing boards throughout the states.215 The basis of the Interior 
Design Lobby’s argument depends on an alleged threat to public 
health and safety that may result from unlicensed practitioners of 
                                                                                                     
 211. See generally The Advancement of Our Profession is in Jeopardy: The 
ALLOW Act is a Threat to the Profession of Interior Design and those who Practice 
It!, ONE VOICE, p2a.co/huzTYIF (last visited Dec. 1, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 212. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (“In the District, for example, 
time consuming and often expensive licensing requirements are imposed on 
would be entry-level interior designers, tour guides, cosmetologists, florists, and 
pest control workers, to name a few—with little or no legitimate public purpose 
served.”). 
 213. See CARPENTER, supra note 23, at 14 (“Aspiring designers must pass a 
national exam, pay an average of $364 in fees and devote an average of almost 
2,200 days—six years—to a combination of education and apprenticeship before 
they can begin work.”). 
 214. See id. at 25 (“[M]ultiple state commissions have studied the issues and 
have concluded that there is simply no need to license interior designers.”). 
 215. See id. at 29 (describing the lengths to which the Interior Design Lobby 
has gone to establish occupational licensing regulatory boards throughout the 
states). 
THE LAND OF THE FREE? 301 
interior design, despite failure of the group to provide any evidence 
indicating such a danger.216 The Interior Design Lobby has reacted 
aggressively to the ALLOW Act. 
The Interior Design Lobby launched a website campaigning 
against the ALLOW Act, calling for citizens to contact their 
senators through an email form included on the website itself.217 
The website threatens that the ALLOW Act “puts the practice 
rights of any firm or individual doing business in Washington, D.C. 
in the cross-hairs of being taken away. More importantly, it 
jeopardizes the public’s safety, health, and welfare by calling into 
question the necessity of an interior designer on a 
construction/renovation project!”218 The website uses additional 
scare tactics and threatens that the Act “could lead to outlawing 
the rights of any interior designer to practice, not just those with a 
license or those trying to obtain one.”219 Reviewing the text of the 
ALLOW Act itself, it appears that this threat misleads the reader 
and is ill-founded. The Act would merely review the licensing 
requirements of the profession and review whether the profession 
even needs the restrictive regulation, and would likely replace 
licensing requirements with less-inhibitive certification 
requirements.220 These measures would actually allow more 
individuals to learn the skillset required to engage in interior 
design, as is permitted in much of the country, not endanger 
practice of the profession, as the site seems to address.221 
While the Interior Design Lobby has not enjoyed widespread 
success in their state campaign encouraging greater regulation for 
their profession, in the states that it has had success in 
establishing heightened regulations, entrance into the profession 
                                                                                                     
 216. See id. at 29–30 (indicating that the Interior Design Lobby has failed to 
implement this legislation in all but Florida, Louisiana, Nevada, and the District 
of Columbia).  
 217. See generally The Advancement of Our Profession is in Jeopardy: The 
ALLOW Act is a Threat to the Profession of Interior Design and those who Practice 
It!, supra note 211. 
 218. See id. (arguing reasons why the ALLOW Act could plausibly effect the 
practice of their profession). 
 219. See id. (warning interior designers that the ALLOW Act could have these 
effects on their practice).  
 220. See generally ALLOW Act, supra note 16. 
 221. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 6 (indicating that only three 
states and the District of Columbia have implemented licensing measures). 
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has become one of the most onerous.222 ALLOW Act legislators 
should take note of the Interior Design Lobby and its focus on 
eliminating this bill in the District, but, if the bill passes, the lobby 
will likely not pose a large threat to additional state adoption of 
similar acts. 
Despite the threats from the Interior Design Lobby, a more 
valid concern over passage of the ALLOW Act resonates from state 
and local officials. Officials have raised concerns that the Act will 
“undemocratically alter the District of Columbia’s local laws 
concerning occupational licensing.”223 These proponents argue that 
passage of the act would impose on decisions that should be in the 
hands local officials with the District, “not by politicians who are 
unaccountable to local residents.”224 These arguments give rise to 
concerns over the constitutionality of a locality’s sovereignty over 
its own economy. 
Courts have recognized that decisions regarding occupational 
licensing fall under a state’s police powers.225 The ALLOW Act 
merely serves as a suggestive model for the states to adopt under 
their respective of their legislative processes. It does not attempt 
to override the states’ ability to regulate occupations as they see 
fit. 
The ALLOW Act directly affects the District’s governance over 
occupational licensing rules.226 Pursuant to Congress’s Article I 
                                                                                                     
 222. See id. at 30 (stating that the interior designer lobby has failed to enjoy 
much success, but has imposed the greatest barriers in the jurisdictions it has 
established itself in). 
 223. See Austermuhle, supra note 134 (describing the trepidation and the 
concerns local officials have over a quintessentially local decision). 
 224. See id. (quoting D.C. Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton (D) in a statement 
concerning the ALLOW Act effect on the District’s economic governance, arguing 
that it is an “imposition” on decisions that should be decided by the District’s local 
government).  
 225. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curium) 
(explaining that states have autonomy over the regulation of their local economies 
under their police powers); see also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light 
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 438 (concluding that a State is free to allocate its governmental 
power to subdivision as it wishes including with regard to regulation of its local 
economies, under its police power); see also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U.S. 773, 791–93 (establishing that states have a compelling interest to govern 
professions that practice under their jurisdiction and therefore have the ability to 
set licensing standards and regulate professions).  
 226. See Austermuhle, supra note 134 (citing Senator Mike Lee in regards to 
the ability of the act under the Federal Enclave Clause to establish control over 
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authority over federal enclaves, which includes the District of 
Columbia, military bases and National Park, the ALLOW Act, if 
passed would provide Congress broad Constitutional authority 
over occupational licensing in the District and over federally owned 
lands.227 
The Federal Enclave Clause grants Congress an extraordinary 
amount of power over federal enclaves, including military bases 
and the District of Columbia, insulating the state from applying its 
own laws to these regions.228 The federal enclave doctrine states 
that, absent congressional consent, a state or local political 
subdivision cannot levy a direct tax on property located on federal 
land and acquired exclusive jurisdiction from the state.229 The 
federal enclave doctrine states: 
Congress shall have the power to exercise exclusive 
legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District (not 
exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by cession of 
particular States and the Acceptance of Congress, become 
the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to 
exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the 
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same 
shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, 
dock-Yards and other needful Buildings.230 
The Enclave Clause empowers Congress to exercise exclusive 
jurisdiction over federal enclaves.231 
                                                                                                     
all the jurisdiction the act attempts to control); see also Senator Mike Lee, supra 
note 176 (remarking the power that Congress must implement the change under 
Congress’s Article I Constitutional powers). 
 227. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (subjecting lands purchased by the 
federal government to the exclusive federal jurisdiction and control of congress, 
exclusive of the state government). 
 228. See Emily S. Miller, The Strongest Defense You’ve Never Heard of: The 
Constitution’s Federal Enclave Doctrine and its Effect on Litigants, States, and 
Congress, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 73, 74 (2011) (describing the power of the 
Federal Enclave Clause). 
 229. See generally George H. Pretty, II & P. Scott Manning, The Federal 
Enclave Doctrine—Property Tax Exclusion based on Constitutional Principles, 24 
J. MULTISTATE TAX’N 26 (Sept. 2014) (articulating the purpose of the federal 
enclave doctrine). 
 230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 231. Id.  
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The Federal Enclave Clause is perhaps best known for 
establishing the District of Columbia.232 The Federal Enclave 
Clause awards Congress the power to “exercise exclusive 
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever over the District of 
Columbia.”233 The use of the phrase “in all Cases whatsoever” 
emphasizes the unquestionable administrative authority that 
Congress exercises over the District and its internal conditions and 
operations.234 Considering the extent of the clause, it seems 
undeniable that Congress has Constitutional control over the 
District’s occupational licensing boards, if the ALLOW Act is 
enacted. 
The Representative status of the District of Columbia within 
Congress remains one of Congress’s oldest controversies,235 and is 
a concern at issue with local governments in regards to the 
ALLOW Act.236 The nonvoting status of the District within the 
United States’ representative system “is fundamentally at odds 
with the principles and traditions of our constitutional system”237 
as the right to vote is one of the most basic and precious rights as 
citizens in a free country.238 Despite the Constitutional ambiguity 
concerning the issue of whether the District should have voting 
authority and representation within Congress, this issue has yet 
                                                                                                     
 232. See Miller, supra note 228, at 75 (discussing the genesis and most notable 
quality of the Federal Enclave Act). 
 233. See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (asserting that Congress 
has the power to enact and control legislation in the District of Columbia). 
 234. See Jonathan Turley, Too Clever by Half: The Unconstitutionality of 
Partial Representation of the District of Columbia in Congress, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 305, 319 (emphasizing the administrative and operation character of the 
power given to Congress in the Federal Enclave Clause and establishing that 
Congress does appear to have Constitutional ability to exercise its power over the 
District). 
 235. See id. at 305 (“When the Democratic majority took control of the 110th 
Congress, one of the first matters on the agenda was one of its the oldest 
controversies: the representational status of the District of Columbia in 
Congress.”).  
 236. See Austermehle, supra note 134 (conveying the concerns of District 
officials, voicing their wishes to be autonomous over the economies of the District). 
 237. See Turley, supra note 234, at 306 (stressing the constitutional 
ambiguity posed by the Federal Enclave Clause). 
 238. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (“No right is more 
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who 
make the laws under which, as good citizens we must live. Other rights, even the 
most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”).  
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to be resolved. Congress has yet to grant the District of Columbia 
representation within Congress, and the ALLOW Act could 
potentially be applied with ease in the District. 
Beyond establishing the Federal government’s jurisdiction 
over the District of Columbia, the Federal Enclave Clause also 
upholds implementation of the Act in the additional targeted 
jurisdictions.239 Regarding Congress’s ability to exercise its 
jurisdiction over military bases and other Federal Lands, there is 
little doubt that the Federal Enclave Clause allows Congress to 
apply this Act to these areas. The Federal Enclave Clause grants 
Congress an extremely powerful jurisdiction over entities, 
including military bases, national parks, post offices, and federal 
courthouses.240 When the United States purchases property from 
a state for purposes set forth in this article of the Constitution with 
the consent of the state legislature, the property is controlled by 
federal jurisdiction, “exclusive of state authority.”241 
After a state transfers authority over a tract of land to the 
federal government, a federal government, “the state may no 
longer impose new state laws on these lands.”242 The federal 
enclave doctrine also preempts any existing state law contrary to 
the mandate or act of Congress.243 Under the Federal Enclave 
                                                                                                     
 239. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 240. See Miller, supra note 228, at 73 (introducing the potential of the federal 
enclave doctrine to create a powerful defense for entities operating on what is 
technically federal land). 
 241. Pretty & Manning, supra note 229, at 28 (discussing the process when 
the federal government purchases state land). George H. Pretty, II and P. Scott 
Manning write: 
Courts have interpreted the phrase “other needful buildings” broadly 
to include whatever structures are found to be necessary in performing 
the function of the federal government. When the United States 
purchases property from a state for purposes set forth in Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution and the state legislature 
consents, the property is generally subject to federal jurisdiction 
exclusive of state authority. Land over which the United States 
government exercises federal legislative jurisdiction is a “federal 
enclave.” 
Id. 
 242. See Allison v. Boeing Laser Technical Services, 689 F.3d 1234, 1235 (10th 
Cir. 2012) (concluding that federal government has jurisdiction over federal 
enclaves). 
 243. See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 268 (1963) (“Since a State may 
not legislate with respect to a federal enclave unless it reserved the right to do so 
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Clause, Congress undoubtedly can implement this Act on military 
bases and National Parks, as it proposes. 
Finally, apart from Congress’s ability to apply this Act 
constitutionally to military bases under the Federal Enclave 
Clause, Congress also secures constitutional authority under the 
Militia Clauses of the Constitution (Militia Clauses).244 The 
ALLOW Act directly applies reciprocity to certain professions that 
require an occupational license.245 The Militia Clauses grant 
Congress the authority “to raise and support Armies”246 and 
provide for the military organization, arming and discipline by any 
means necessary.247 The court have held that regarding the Militia 
Clauses, the Constitution grants Congress unlimited power to 
provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia.248 
Courts have given Congress broad discretion in determining what 
constitutes as an action necessary to provide for the nation’s 
military, as the issues typically invoke questions of policy.249 The 
                                                                                                     
when it gave its consent to the purchase by the United States, only state law 
existing at the time of the acquisition remains enforceable, not subsequent laws.”) 
(citations omitted); see also Brookhaven Sci. Assocs. v. Donaldson, No. 04-4013 
(LAP), 2007 WL 2319141, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2007) (stating that any claim 
brought by the state on a federal enclave is preempted by the Constitution).  
 244. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12; U.S. Const. art 1, § 8, cl. 16. 
 245. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16. 
 246. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12. 
 247. Id.  § 8, cl. 16. 
 248. Accord Donn v. A.W. Chesterton Co., Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 803, 813–14 
(E.D. Pa. 2012) (finding that procurement of goods and materials for military 
operations fall within the federal government’s exercise of war powers because 
their role was to supply Naval vessels, therefore protecting their actions, despite 
the fact that they were not involved in military operations during wartime); see 
Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 349 (2009) (concluding that, 
pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, Congress may provide for the common defense, 
raise and support armies, make rules for Armed Forces operations, and enact 
necessary and proper laws,  for such purposes, granting additional powers to 
Congress); see also Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 9 (1820) (finding that Congress 
has unlimited power to provide for the organization, arming, and discipline of the 
militia).  
 249. See Donn, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 814 (finding that the issue in the case 
implicated policy issues and therefore gave rise to the political question doctrine, 
which excludes controversies which revolve around policy choices and value 
determinations reserved for Congress (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. 
Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986))).  
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political question doctrine preempts courts from judicial review of 
controversies that involve policy choices.250 
In upholding the constitutionality of the ALLOW Act’s section 
regarding acceptance of occupational license from other states, one 
could argue that providing opportunity for military spouses to 
secure employment falls under the purview of the Militia Clauses 
and is protected under the political question doctrine. Congress 
has the authority to raise and support the armies and to provide 
for the general military organization as necessary.251 The courts 
have found that this applies to issues not only involved in military 
operations during wartime, but also in Congress’s capacity to 
support military acts.252 The ability to keep military families 
together and ensure employment for spouses after transferring to 
various military posts across state lines to support the service 
member in their family could arguably serve as a verifiable 
Congressional act to “support” the military. Applying this logic, the 
ALLOW Act would allow the spouse to overcome licensing 
requirements on the military base, preempting state preference to 
deny a military spouse employment on these grounds. In addition, 
the policies the ALLOW Act pursues regarding encouragement of 
family autonomy with this reciprocity would fall under the 
Political Question Doctrine, preempting judicial review of any 
challenge to applying the policy on military installments.253 The 
ALLOW Act would likely pass constitutional muster under the 
Constitution’s Militia Clauses and the Political Question Doctrine. 
A. Can the ALLOW Act Go Further? 
Occupational licensing regimes have undoubtedly created 
incredible burdens on individuals seeking employment across the 
                                                                                                     
 250. See id. at 818 (discussing the types of claims the political question 
doctrine precludes from judicial review, including requiring courts to evaluate the 
wisdom of military policy). 
 251. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12; U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 16. 
 252. See Donn, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 814 (concluding that actions that supported 
the military, even during non-wartimes, fell under the purview of Congressional 
oversight under the militia clause). 
 253. See id. at 815 (determining that a political question is found when the 
issue is inherently political in nature or would cause the court to make a policy 
determination on behalf of Congress). 
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states. Reform is necessary to address, evaluate, and remedy these 
issues, especially for the majority of professions that impact low- 
to moderate-income workers, as their professions typically do not 
pose possible repercussions to the general public’s health and 
safety.254 In addition, the commitment of the previous 
administration in improving the ability of former military 
personnel and their families as well as the focus seem to, at least, 
seem to call for occupational licensing reciprocity beyond military 
bases.255 The ALLOW Act likely could not be expanded to 
encompass and address these concerns entirely. 
Pursuant to the United States Constitution’s Tenth 
Amendment, any power “not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively.”256 Accordingly, occupational licensing falls 
under the purview of the state’s right to control its local economies 
and is found amongst the state’s police powers.257 Further, in 
balancing between an individual’s interest in the right to choose 
their own profession, courts have often sided with the states’ 
licensing boards, granting deference to licensing, that has 
traditionally been considered a function of the state. 
While courts have begun to notice and take action on 
restrictive and absurd occupational licensing requirements,258 the 
                                                                                                     
 254. See Kleiner, supra note 39, at 189 (agreeing that some occupations do 
require a higher level of oversight, especially when failure to properly train 
individuals can create hazardous circumstances that could be deadly or 
dangerous, but that the majority of professions subject to licensing do not fall 
within this category). 
 255. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 200 (asserting 
the importance of providing professional opportunity for former military 
personnel as well as active duty military families). 
 256. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 257. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) 
(establishing that states are able to regulate their own economies under their 
police powers); see also License Cases, 46 U.S. 504, 583 (1847) (describing the 
extent of what police powers cover within the state, including the power to govern 
all things “within the limits of its dominion”); see also Klein, supra note 23, at 415 
(stating that occupational licensing is controlled at the state level and falls within 
a state’s police powers). 
 258. See Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 90 
(Tex. 2015) (ruling that irrelevant tasks labeled as training hours, egregious 
training expense, and various other practices proved that the licensing 
requirements were unreasonable, harsh, and violated the state’s Constitution, 
interfering with citizen applicant’s enjoyment of their life and liberty). 
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clearest and most expeditious way for occupational licensing 
reform falls to state legislatures. By adopting the suggested 
reforms outlined in the proposed ALLOW Act, states can begin 
what is sure to be a slow process of reforming occupational 
licensing boards and its requirements. 
V. Conclusion 
As it stands today, the ALLOW Act is Constitutionally 
defensible. Occupational Licensing has imposed a restrictive 
regime on both the consumer and the worker, created arbitrary 
barriers designed to increase the power of the licensing board and 
restrict competition. While necessary and useful in some 
professions, in the clear majority of licensed occupations, the need 
for legislative review is essential to determine less restrictive and 
workable means for individuals to obtain the right to work. The 
ALLOW Act provides a valuable legislative model for reviewing 
these regulatory regimes. Further, the ALLOW Act provides relief 
for military families,259 who often feel the effects of occupational 
regulation most harshly, as they are more often subject to 
undergoing additional and duplicate training, education and lofty 
fees to obtain licensing for a profession they are already licensed 
in elsewhere.260 While there are limits to expanding the legislation 
on the federal level, it is imperative that state officials passionate 
about protection the economic rights of their citizens look to the 
model legislation laid out in the ALLOW Act. Though progress may 
begin slowly, considering the backlash surely to come from existing 
professional boards upon dismantling these regimes, state 
legislators should remain diligent. By drafting their own 
legislation, states can truly promote their citizens’ right to work. 
                                                                                                     
 259. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16 (stating one purpose of the act is “To 
promote economic opportunity for military families”). 
 260. See generally ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20. 
